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INTRODUCTION

Since June 26, 2000, "tens of thousands of federal prisoners ... serving drug-related sentences" have been seeking hope in a United States
Supreme Court decision.1 In Apprendi v. New Jersey,2 the Supreme
Court held that any fact, other than prior convictions, used to increase
a defendant's sentence beyond the maximum prescribed by the applicable statute must be submitted to the jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.3 This initially overlooked 4 and important decision has
1. Brooke A. Masters, High Court Ruling May Rewrite Sentencing; Changes in
Guidelines, Raft of Appeals Feared After Justices' Decision, WASH. POST, July 23, 2000,

at Al.
2. 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000).
3. Id. at 2355.
4. This decision was initially overlooked because it was released the same week
as Stenberg v. Carhart,120 S. Ct. 2597, 2605 (2000) (rejecting Nebraska law prohibit-
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called into question the sentences of thousands of prisoners convicted
under two major federal drug statutes5 and threatens to burden criminal prosecutors with an overwhelming number of appeals.6
While the Apprendi decision will likely mean that facts regarding
drug type and quantity used to increase a defendant's sentence beyond the statutory maximum must be proven beyond a reasonable
doubt to a jury, it should not be retroactively applied to allow collat-

eral attacks7 on convictions and sentences finalized 8 prior to the June
26, 2000, decision. First, Apprendi does not fall under either excep-

ing "partial birth" abortions), Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 120 S. Ct. 2446, 2458
(2000) (holding Boy Scouts of America have a right to bar homosexuals from membership), and Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326, 2336-37 (2000) (affirming
Miranda warnings about the right to remain silent during police interrogation).
5. 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 960 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
6. Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2394-95 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (stating that the
decision would provoke "a flood of petitions by convicted defendants seeking to invalidate their sentences").
7. A collateral attack upon a conviction is an effort by a prisoner in custody to
seek relief in a proceeding other than that in which the judgment of conviction was
rendered. See BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 255 (7th ed. 1999). A § 2255 motion is the
proper means to challenge the validity or lawfulness of a conviction. 28 U.S.C. § 2255
(Supp. V 1999).
A prisoner in federal custody must generally file a motion to vacate, set aside, or
correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 rather than file a petition for a writ
of habeas corpus. Id. A prisoner in federal custody may not petition for writ of
habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 if he has not filed a § 2255 motion for
relief or if he has been denied relief under § 2255, unless he can show that the § 2255
remedy is "inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention." Id. See
discussion infra Part IV.B.
8. The courts of appeals have differing views as to when a federal conviction
becomes "final" for § 2255(1) purposes. Section 2244(d)(1), which is applicable to
collateral review of state court decisions, also provides for a one-year period of limitations. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (Supp. IV 1998). However, § 2244(d)(1) provides that
the one-year period begins from the "date on which the judgment became final by the
conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review." Id.
Section 2255(1) provides merely that the limitation period runs from the "date on
which the judgment of conviction becomes final." 28 U.S.C. § 2255(1) (Supp. V
1999). It is well-settled among the circuits that a judgment becomes final when a
petition for certiorari is denied by the Supreme Court or when the Supreme Court
issues a decision on the merits if the defendant seeks certiorari. United States v.
Thomas, 203 F.3d 350, 354 (5th Cir. 2000).
However, there is conflict among the circuits with respect to when a federal criminal conviction becomes final if the defendant does not petition for writ of certiorari
from the judgment of the appellate court. For example, the Third, Fourth, and Tenth
Circuits hold the similar view that a judgment becomes final "when a criminal defendant's options for further direct review are foreclosed, rather than when the highest
court to consider the case issues its judgment." Id. at 352 (citations omitted); United
States v. Torres, 211 F.3d 836, 840 (4th Cir. 2000); United States v. Burch, 202 F.3d
1274, 1276 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding that judgment is final after time for seeking certiorari review has expired). However, the Seventh Circuit adheres to the view that
where a defendant does not seek further review, a conviction becomes final when the
highest court to consider the case issues its mandate in the direct criminal appeal
rather than when the time period for seeking further review has expired. Thomas,
203 F.3d at 353; Burch, 202 F.3d at 1276 (citing Gendron v. United States, 154 F.3d
672, 674 (7th Cir. 1998)).
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tion to the general rule that new constitutional rules of criminal procedure are not retroactively applicable on collateral review. 9 Second,
making this new decision retroactive would endanger the federal criminal justice system, undercut the principle of finality, and create a
flood of unnecessary litigation. a
Part II of this Note sets forth the history behind the Apprendi decision, the Court's rationale, and Apprendi's impact on prior Supreme
Court decisions. Part III argues against the new rule's applicability to
felony drug convictions on collateral review. Part IV describes the
common law and statutory restrictions that should preclude prisoners
from invoking this new procedural rule on collateral attack.
II.
A.

APPRENDI V. NEW JERSEY

Factualand ProceduralBackground

Apprendi involved a racially motivated shooting that took place on
December 22, 1994, in Vineland, New Jersey." Before dawn that
morning, Charles Apprendi, a white man, fired gunshots into the
home of an African-American family because he did not want the
family in "his" otherwise all-white neighborhood.' 2 The State charged
Apprendi with a twenty-three count indictment. 3 Apprendi pleaded
guilty to three counts in exchange for dismissal of the remaining
twenty counts. 4
The controversy turned on the sentence that was ultimately imposed. One of the three counts to which Apprendi pleaded guiltypossession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose-carried a term of
imprisonment of five to ten years. 15 However, New Jersey's hate
crime statute provided for an extended term of ten to twenty years if
the trial judge found, "by a preponderance of the evidence, that the
defendant... committ[ed a] crime.., with a purpose to intimidate [a
person] or group ... because of race."16 Immediately before sentencing, the prosecutor moved to enhance Apprendi's sentence pursuant
to New Jersey's hate crime law. 7 Subsequently, the judge concluded
that Apprendi's actions were motivated by racial
bias and enhanced
8
Apprendi's sentence to twelve years in prison.'
9. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989) (plurality opinion).
10. Masters, supra note 1, at Al. See also Cherylyn Waibel, Case Note, Apprendi
v. New Jersey, 120 S.Ct. 2348 (2000), 25 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 273, 285-86 (2001);
Tony Mauro & Jonathan Ringel, Court's Apprendi Hate Crime Decision May Have
Broad Impact on Sentencing, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, June 28, 2000, at 4.
11. Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2351.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 2352.
14. Id.

15. Id. (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-6(a)(2) (West 1995)).
16. Id. at 2351 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:43-7(a)(3), :44-3(e) (West 1995)).
17. Id. at 2352.
18. Id.
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The issue presented to the Supreme Court in Apprendi was whether
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment permits a state
to design a sentencing system that takes sentencing enhancements that
expose a defendant to punishment beyond the statutory maximum
away from the jury and gives them to the trial judge for determination
based on a preponderance of the evidence. 19 The answer was no.2°
The Supreme Court held by a 5-4 majority that this method of sentencing enhancement violated the defendant's notice and jury trial
rights under the Sixth Amendment and his due process rights under
the Fourteenth Amendment because he was sentenced beyond the
maximum penalty under the firearm statute. 21 The Court concluded
that, in effect, Apprendi was subjected to punishment designed for a
first-degree crime (based on facts neither submitted to the jury nor
proven beyond a reasonable doubt) where he was actually charged
with and convicted of a second-degree offense.22
B.

The Majority's Opinion and Rationale

The Supreme Court based its reasoning on Jones v. United States,2 3
which interpreted the text of the multi-part federal carjacking statute,
18 U.S.C. § 2119.24 In what was then dictum, the Supreme Court
stated that
under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the notice and jury trial guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, any fact
(other than prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty
for a crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury,
and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.2 5
The statute at issue in Jones provides that the maximum sentence for
carjacking is fifteen years imprisonment.2 6 But the same statute adds
that if serious bodily injury results from the offense, the defendant
may be sentenced to a term of up to twenty-five years.2 7 Additionally,
19. Id. at 2351-52.
20. Id. at 2363.
21. Id. at 2351, 2362-63.
22. Id. at 2363.
23. 526 U.S. 227 (1999), cited in Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2355.
24. 18 U.S.C. § 2119 provides that any person who,
with the intent to cause death or serious bodily harm takes a motor vehicle
...from the person or presence of another by force and violence or by
intimidation, or attempts to do so, shall(1) be ... imprisoned not more than 15 years, or ...
(2) if serious bodily injury.., results, be... imprisoned not more than 25
years ....

18 U.S.C. § 2119(1)-(2) (Supp. V 1999) (footnote omitted). Furthermore, if death
occurs, the defendant faces a maximum of life imprisonment or death. 18 U.S.C.
§ 2119(3) (1994).
25. Jones, 526 U.S. at 243 n.6.
26. 18 U.S.C. § 2119(1) (Supp. V 1999).
27. Id. § 2119(2).
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if death results, the defendant may be subjected to a maximum penalty of life imprisonment. 28 In Jones, the Court adhered to the doctrine that statutes should be construed to avoid constitutional issues
and held that each portion of the carjacking statute constitutes a separate element of the offense rather than a mere sentencing provision.2 9
The Fifth and Sixth Amendments of the United States Constitution
require that criminal convictions rest upon a jury determination that
the defendant is guilty of every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.3" Rather than hold the statute unconstitutional, the Court
mandated that serious bodily injury, a sentence-increasing fact under
18 U.S.C. § 2119, was an element that must be submitted to the jury
and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.3 1
In Apprendi, the Supreme Court formally adopted the dictum from
Jones.3" The holding was based on the accused's protection under the
Due Process Clause "against conviction except upon proof beyond a
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with
which he is charged."3 3 The Court held that any fact enhancing a sentence beyond the maximum authorized by the statute "is the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense than the one
covered by the jury's guilty verdict"-even if the fact was previously
treated as a sentencing factor to be determined by the court.34 Facts
that have this effect, despite their label, constitute an element of the
offense and thus entitle the defendant to a jury determination of each
fact beyond a reasonable doubt.35 The Supreme Court, therefore, declared New Jersey's hate crime statute unconstitutional because it allowed a jury to convict a defendant of a second-degree offense on its
finding beyond a reasonable doubt and then permitted a judge to impose punishment designed for first-degree crimes on a finding of certain predicate facts by a preponderance of the evidence.3 6 Ultimately,
the new rule from Apprendi mandates that "[o]ther than the fact of a
prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury,
and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."3 7
28. 18 U.S.C. § 2119(3) (1994).
29. Jones, 526 U.S. at 243 & n.6.
30. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 510 (1995).
31. Jones, 526 U.S. at 243 & n.6. Accord Apprendi v. New Jersey, 120 S. Ct. 2348,
2362-63 (2000).
32. Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2362-63.
33. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970), cited in Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2350.
34. Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2365 n.19.
35. See id. at 2355. "[R]elevant inquiry is one not of form, but of effect," so that
Sentencing Guidelines, as well as facts specified within penalty provisions under the
statute itself, are considered elements of an offense if their applicability subjects the
defendant to a greater punishment than the maximum set forth for the offense itself.

Id. at 2365.
36. Id. at 2363.
37. Id. at 2362-63.
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Apprendi's Effect on Traditional Criminal
Procedureand Precedent

It is likely that federal prisoners will attempt to overextend the
reach of Apprendi to collaterally challenge the constitutionality of any
sentence enhanced under the Sentencing Guidelines. In fact, Justice
O'Connor argued in her dissent that the majority opinion in Apprendi
would cast doubt on "all determinate-sentencing schemes in which the
length of a defendant's sentence within the statutory range turns on
specific factual determinations," predicting that "each new sentence
will rest on shaky ground."3 While this decision appears to provide a
strong argument for all persons convicted under certain federal statutes, the actual number of cases it affects is quite limited.
First, Apprendi did not hold that all facts enhancing a sentence beyond the statutory maximum must be specifically alleged in the indictment. The Court noted that Apprendi had not raised any question
concerning the sufficiency of the indictment, and therefore, did not
address whether facts that increase the statutory maximum must be
charged in the indictment.39
Second, the Supreme Court did not overrule McMillan v. Pennsylvania,n° which upheld the required imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence based on a finding made by the sentencing judge on a
preponderance of the evidence standard.4 Apprendi merely limits
McMillan to those "cases that do not involve.., imposition of a sentence more severe than the statutory
maximum for the offense estab42
lished by the jury's verdict.
If the non-jury factual determination only narrows the sentencing
judge's discretion within the range already authorized by the offense ...

,

the legislature [may] raise the minimum penalty associ-

ated with a crime based on non-jury factual findings, as long as the
penalty is within the range specified for the crime for which the de-

fendant was convicted.4 3

Third, a defendant's prior convictions may still be constitutionally
treated as a sentencing factor rather than as an element of the offense
and may be found by a judge on a preponderance of the evidence,
even if doing so increases the applicable statutory maximum penalty. 4
38. Id. at 2391, 2395 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
39. Id. at 2355-56 n.3.

40. Id. at 2361 n.13; McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986).
41. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 81-82 (upholding Pennsylvania's Mandatory Minimum
Sentencing Act requiring that anyone convicted of certain felonies would be subject
to a mandatory minimum penalty of five years imprisonment if the judge found, by a
preponderance of evidence, that the person visibly possessed a firearm in the course
of committing one of the specified felonies).
42. Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2361 n.13.
43. United States v. Aguayo-Delgado, 220 F.3d 926, 933-34 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
531 U.S. 1026 (2000).
44. Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2361-63.
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The Court in Apprendi held that this rule, taken from AlmendarezTorres v. United States,4 5 is a narrow exception to the new rule.4 6 In
dictum, however, the Court stated that Almendarez-Torres could arguably have been decided incorrectly. 47 The Court declined to address the validity of recidivism only because Apprendi did not raise it
on appeal.48 This statement foreshadows a possible change in the
treatment of prior convictions should the Court ever rule on the issue.
Fourth, Apprendi did not invalidate the United States Sentencing
Guidelines. Relevant conduct determinations will still be made under
the Guidelines to determine a defendant's sentence within the statutory maximum.

49

The Court was not called upon to declare the consti-

tutionality of the Sentencing Guidelines and consequently
"express[ed] no view on the subject beyond what this Court has already held."' 50 The Sentencing Guidelines have the force and effect of
the law, 5 1 but the "maximum sentence set by statute trumps a higher
sentence set forth in the Guidelines."52 The Sentencing Guidelines
are merely used to limit the sentencing judge's discretion by requiring
the court to consider specific factors in setting sentences within the
statutory maximum.53 As long as the resulting sentence does not exceed the maximum provided under the applicable statute, courts are
still free to use their discretion to increase or decrease punishment
based on aggravating or mitigating factors under the Sentencing
Guidelines.5 4 If courts use the guidelines to channel their discretion
45. 523 U.S. 224, 226-27 (1998). In Almendarez-Torres, the Court based its decision on federal courts' long-standing tradition of treating recidivism as punishment
enhancers. Id. at 243. Prior convictions do not make up a material element or go to
part of the definition of the offense, nor does a prior conviction constitute a new
crime. Id. (citing Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616, 624 (1912)). Rather, the
Court in Almendarez-Torres feared that turning prior convictions into a material element would create potential for jury prejudice. Id. at 235. Accord Spencer v. Texas,
385 U.S. 554, 560 (1967).
The Court anticipated that juries, despite a limiting instruction, would use the existence of a prior conviction as propensity evidence. See Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S.
at 235, for the Supreme Court's rationale behind excluding prior convictions as an
element of the offense. The Federal Rules of Evidence prohibit this type of evidence.
FED. R. EviD. 404(b) (prohibiting evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts to prove
character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith).
46. Apprendi, 120 S.Ct. at 2362.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Talbott v. Indiana, 226 F.3d 866, 869 (7th Cir. 2000). See also Sustache-Rivera
v. United States, 221 F.3d 8, 10 (1st Cir. 2000) (stating that serious bodily injury during a carjacking may be treated as a sentencing factor by a judge), cert. denied, 121 S.
Ct. 1364 (2001).
50. Apprendi, 120 S.Ct. at 2366 n.21 (2000).
51. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 413 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
52. Edwards v. United States, 523 U.S. 511, 515 (1998).
53. Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389, 402 (1995).
54. Apprendi, 120 S.Ct. at 2358; Edwards, 523 U.S. at 513-15.
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within the statutory range of penalties, there is no issue as to the constitutionality of the Sentencing Guidelines under the Apprendi rule."
While the effect of Apprendi is not as broad as it first might appear,
the decision left open two important issues that remain the focus of
this Note. First, Apprendi dealt with two separate state statutes having the combined effect of enhancing the defendant's sentence beyond
that provided in the firearm statute alone.56 Thus, the opinion leaves
open the issue of Apprendi's applicability to many multi-part federal
crime statutes, most obviously the federal drug statutes, 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(b) and 21 U.S.C. § 960(b)." Second, Apprendi was a case on
direct appeal. Therefore, the Court did not address the impact it
would have on federal prisoners attempting to invoke the Apprendi
principle to vacate, set aside, or correct their convictions or sentences
on collateral review.58
III.

COLLATERAL ATTACKS ON FEDERAL DRUG CONVICTIONS
PURSUANT TO THE APPRENDI PRINCIPLE

A.

Apprendi's Applicability to the Federal Drug Statutes

Section 841(a) of Title 21 of the United States Code prohibits a person from "manufactur[ing], distribut[ing], or dispens[ing], or possess[ing] with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a
controlled substance; or... a counterfeit substance."59 Section 960(a)
makes it illegal to "import[] or export[ ]" or "possess[] on board a
vessel, aircraft, or vehicle a controlled substance."6 Both statutes establish sliding scales of maximum penalties to which a narcotics offender may be subject, depending upon: (1) the type and amount of
narcotics the defendant distributed or possessed; (2) whether serious
bodily injury or death occurred as a result of the violation; and (3)
55. See Edwards, 523 U.S. at 515; Witte, 515 U.S. at 400-04. "[Clonsideration of
information about the defendant's character and conduct at sentencing does not result

in 'punishment' for any offense other than the one of which the defendant was convicted." Witte, 515 U.S. at 401. Examples of aggravating and mitigating sentencing
factors under the Sentencing Guidelines are: (1) whether the defendant was an organizer, leader, or manager in the commission of the offense; (2) whether the defen-

dant's actions constituted an obstruction of justice; and (3) whether the defendant

provided substantial assistance to public authority in the prosecution of another defendant. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 3B1.1(c), 3C1.1, 5K1.1 (1998).
56. Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2351.
57. See Robyn Blumer, Court Says Juries, Not Judges, Must Decide the Crime, ST.

PETERSBURG TIMES, Aug. 6, 2000, at 3D. "Susan Klein, a professor at the University
of Texas Law School and a former federal prosecutor, said she has identified at least
40 federal criminal statutes that appear to be unconstitutional under these new rules."
Id.
58. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Supp. V 1999) (allowing federal prisoners to challenge
the constitutional validity of their convictions and sentences by motion). See also
supra text accompanying notes 2-5.
59. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1994).
60. Id. § 960(a).
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whether the defendant has prior drug convictions.6 1 For example, 21
U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) provides for a maximum sentence of twenty
years imprisonment (or thirty years if the defendant has a prior felony
drug conviction) for cocaine trafficking offenses, without regard to
drug amount. 62 Section 841(b)(1)(B) prescribes a forty-year maximum sentence (or a maximum of life imprisonment if the defendant
has a prior felony drug conviction) for offenses involving 500 grams or
more of cocaine. 63 Section 841(b)(1)(A) provides for a maximum sentence of life imprisonment for offenses involving five kilograms or
more of cocaine.64
Determining drug quantity is crucial to the statutory sentencing
range because the severity of the penalties prescribed under §§ 841(b)
and 960(b) depend upon the volume and type of drugs manufactured
and sold. The issue surrounding the federal drug statutes turns on
whether permitting a judge to determine drug quantity and type by a
preponderance of the evidence and then punish a defendant with
more prison time than he would receive for trace amounts, infringes
the defendant's constitutional right to have his guilt judged by a jury
of his peers.6 5
The recent practice in federal courts has been that the court, rather
than the jury, determines drug type and quantity. 66 This practice occurs because the federal drug statutes only instruct the jury to determine whether the defendant has possessed, manufactured, or
distributed a controlled substance to establish guilt.67 The federal
government's burden of proof has been, therefore, to prove quantity
only by a preponderance of the evidence rather than beyond a reasonable doubt. 68 The United States Probation Office, in their pre-sentence report (PSR), would then recommend to the district court a
sentence based on trial testimony, investigative reports from the DEA
and FBI, and reports of arrests, seizures, and undercover drug transactions from local law enforcement agencies. 69 Finally, the district court
would apply the Sentencing Guidelines to calculate a defendant's of61. Id. §§ 841(b)(1), 960(b).
62. Id. § 841(b)(1)(C).

63. Id. § 841(b)(1)(B).
64. Id. § 841(b)(1)(A). See also id. § 960(b)(1)-(4), for similar provisions.
65. See United States v. Buckland, 259 F.3d 1157, 1163 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding
that 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(A) and (B) are facially unconstitutional under Apprendi
because they permit the judge to determine the quantity of drugs under a preponderance of the evidence standard and increase the maximum penalty). However, the
court further stated that the unconstitutional sections "are severable from the remainder of the statute." Id. at 1169.
66. United States v. Aguayo-Delgado, 220 F.3d 926, 929 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
531 U.S. 1026 (2000).
67. See United States v. Grimaldo, 214 F.3d 967, 972-73 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
531 U.S. 939 (2000), and cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1081 (2001).
68. See id.
69. See Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389, 393-94 (1995).
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fense level and sentence according to drug type and amount found

attributable to the defendant in the PSR.7 °

Prior to Apprendi, the Eighth Circuit, in United States v.
Grimaldo,7 1 rejected the idea that drug quantity is a material element

under the federal drug statutes, 72 recognizing clear legislative intent to

make drug quantity a sentencing factor.73 Historically, all other circuit courts have held the same, interpreting the holding in Jones74 as
"a suggestion rather than an absolute rule."7 5 The Eighth Circuit was

also the first federal appellate court to consider Apprendi's applica-

tion to drug amounts 76 and found that the new rule applies to federal
drug cases.7 7 In United States v. Aguayo-Delgado,7 s the court discov-

ered it had erred in concluding that the drug type and quantity rules
under § 841(b) are sentencing factors rather than elements.79 On the
other hand, the Seventh Circuit has held that Apprendi did "not affect
the holding of Edwards v. United States, that the judge alone deter-

mines drug types and quantities when imposing sentences short of the
statutory maximum. 8 °
A large part of the Supreme Court's reasoning for its decision in
Apprendi reflects its reaction to the specific facts of the case. 81 The
Court invalidated New Jersey's hate crime statute because the statute
allowed a trial judge to increase a maximum sentence based on assessment of a defendant's degree of culpability or mens rea by a preponderance of the evidence.8 2 The statute required enhancement based

on the defendant's state of mind, or "purpose to intimidate."83
Through its reference to Black's Law Dictionary's definition of the

word, the Court implied that a defendant's "purpose" is equivalent to

70. See Aguayo-Delgado, 220 F.3d at 928.
71. Grimaldo, 214 F.3d at 967.
72. Id. at 972.
73. Id.
74. Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999).
75. United States v. Angle, 230 F.3d 113, 122 (4th Cir. 2000).
76. See Robert Batey, Sentencing Guidelines and Statutory Maximums in Florida:
How Best to Respond to Apprendi, FLA. B.J., Nov. 2000, at 57, 59 n.2.
77. United States v. Aguayo-Delgado, 220 F.3d 926, 933-34 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
531 U.S. 1026 (2000). See also United States v. McIntosh, 236 F.3d 968, 975-76 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 121 S.Ct. 1964 (2001); United States v. Lafreniere, 236 F.3d 41, 50
(1st Cir. 2001) (discussing the Eighth Circuit's holding in Aguayo-Delgado).
78. Aguayo-Delgado, 220 F.3d at 926.
79. Id. at 930-33 (recognizing that the court in United States v. Wood, 834 F.2d
1382 (8th Cir. 1987), had erred when it determined that drug quantity was a sentencing factor rather than an element of the offense).
80. Talbott v. Indiana, 226 F.3d 866, 869-70 (7th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted) (citing Edwards v. United States, 523 U.S. 511, 513-14 (1998) (recognizing that the Sentencing Guidelines instruct the judge to determine both the amount and kind of
controlled substances for which a defendant is held accountable and then "impose a
sentence that varies depending upon amount and kind")).
81. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 120 S.Ct. 2348 (2000).
82. Id. at 2363-64.
83. Id. at 2364.
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intent. 84 Thus, the prohibited intent in committing a crime under New
Jersey's hate crime statute was "as close as one might hope to come to
a core criminal offense 'element.' '"85 The Court found that Apprendi's motives and racial prejudice, therefore, constituted a mens
rea element of an aggravated offense rather than a sentencing factor
used to increase his punishment.86
Aside from the foregoing rationale, the Supreme Court held that
"[d]espite ...the clear 'elemental' nature of the factor here, [racial
bias], the relevant inquiry is one not of form, but of effect-does the
required finding expose the defendant to a greater punishment than
that authorized by the jury's guilty verdict?" 8 If the finding of any
fact exposes the defendant to a penalty beyond the maximum set out
in the statutory offense, "[t]he degree of criminal culpability the legislature chooses to associate with particular, factually distinct conduct
has significant implications both for a defendant's very liberty, and for
the heightened stigma associated with an offense."8 8 Thus, the effect
that the factual finding has on the defendant's sentence determines
whether it is an element of the offense or a sentencing factor.
Under this analysis, it is evident that drug quantity will now be considered an element with respect to the federal drug statutes. The penalty schemes in §§ 841 and 960 are intended and designed to impose
more severe penalties upon those who distribute larger quantities of
drugs. 8 9 However, as Justice O'Connor argued in her dissent, Apprendi did not overrule Walton v. Arizona.90 There, the Court held
that a judge, rather than a jury, "must determine the existence or nonexistence of statutory aggravating and mitigating factors" authorizing
the imposition of a death sentence.9 1 So it is difficult to understand
why the fact of drug quantity, which only subjects a defendant to a
broader range of imprisonment, could not be judge-determined when
a judge may make the more severe determination of life or death in
capital cases.92

84. See id. at 2364 n.17 (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1137 (rev. 4th ed.
1968)). The Supreme Court further notes, however, that the state appellate court did
not need to further define intent because of the applicable statutory language. Id.
85. Id. at 2364.
86. See id. at 2365-66.
87. Id. at 2365.
88. Id.

89. See, e.g., Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 461, 465 (1991) (discussing
the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986)).
90. Apprendi, 120 S.Ct. at 2388 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Walton v. Arizona, 497
U.S. 639 (1990).
91. Apprendi, 120 S.Ct. at 2387 (citing Walton, 497 U.S. at 643).
92. See Walton, 497 U.S. at 643 (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(B) (West
1989)).
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Despite this argument, the Supreme Court recently vacated the
93 In
Tenth Circuit's judgment in United States v. Jones (Jones 1).
Jones H, a grand jury indictment charged Jones with cocaine possession in violation of § 841(b)(1)(C). 94 Based on government evidence,
the sentencing judge concluded that the amount of cocaine base involved in the offense was 165.5 grams and sentenced Jones to 360
months imprisonment under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii). 95 This
statute carries a maximum term of life imprisonment for fifty grams or
more of a mixture containing cocaine base.96
On appeal, Jones argued that he was sentenced above the statutory
maximum because quantity was neither alleged in the indictment nor
submitted to the jury on a reasonable doubt instruction. 97 The Tenth
Circuit declined to re-examine whether the Fifth and Sixth Amendments of the United States Constitution require the issue of drug
quantity determinations under § 841(b)(1) to be submitted to the jury
and proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 98 Subsequently, the Supreme
Court "remanded [that decision] for further consideration in light of
Apprendi."99
On remand, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that
drug quantity is an essential element of the offense if it increases a
defendant's sentence beyond the statutory maximum and that the sentence imposed upon Jones impermissibly exceeded the maximum penalty charged in the indictment. 10 Thus, the Tenth Circuit vacated
Jones's sentence and remanded the case to the district court for resentencing pursuant to § 841(b)(1)(C). 1 1
Jones H foreshadows the likely result that Apprendi does change the
traditional treatment of drug quantity as a sentencing factor. 102 Failure to treat drug quantity as a material element of sentences prior to
93. 194 F.3d 1178 (10th Cir. 1999) [hereinafter Jones II,vacated, 120 S. Ct. 2739

(2000).
94. Jones H, 194 F.3d at 1180.
95. Id. at 1181.
96. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) (1994).
97. Jones H, 194 F.3d at 1183.
98. Id. at 1183-86.
99. Jones v. United States, 120 S.Ct. 2739 (2000). See also United States v. Angle,
230 F.3d 113, 121 (4th Cir. 2000) (recognizing that sentencing factors that support a
sentence within the statutorily prescribed range submitted to a judge on a preponderance of the evidence standard are not forbidden by Apprendi).
100. United States v. Jones, 235 F.3d 1231, 1238 (10th Cir. 2000).
101. Id.
102. See Angle, 230 F.3d at 121. See also United States v. Nordby, 225 F.3d 1053,
1056 (9th Cir. 2000) (overruling prior cases that did not require drug quantity to be
submitted to the jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt when defendants were
sentenced beyond the statutory maximum); United States v. Meshack, 225 F.3d 556,
576 (5th Cir. 2000) (stating that Apprendi does not resolve the issue of whether a
sentence enhancement that does not exceed the statutory range must be proven to the
jury), cert. denied sub nom., Parker v. United States, 531 U.S. 1100 (2001).
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the Apprendi decision, however, should still not be an issue cognizable
on collateral attack.
B.

Apprendi Should Not Apply on CollateralReview

Federal prisoners are now coming forth to invoke the Apprendi
principle on collateral attack pursuant to a motion under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255,103 asserting a violation of their constitutional rights due to the
prosecutor's failure to charge and submit drug type and quantity to
the jury on a reasonable doubt instruction.' 0 4 These prisoners are
clinging to false hope by claiming that failure to comply with Apprendi's new procedural standard prior to the date it was issued constitutes error of such magnitude as to justify reversal of otherwise
valid sentences. First, Apprendi is a new constitutional rule of procedure, which is not applicable to collateral attacks under Teague v.
Lane.'0 5 Second, making this new rule retroactively available to prisoners seeking habeas relief threatens the finality of thousands of federal drug convictions and sentences. Third, it is unlikely that the
prisoners would be able to show actual and substantial prejudice, infecting the entire trial with error.10 6 In fact, it has been held that any
error in failing to instruct the jury on an essential element of the
charged offense is subject to the harmless error standard.'0 7
1. A New Constitutional Rule of Criminal Procedure
A motion to vacate a conviction and sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255108 is now the general post-conviction remedy for prisoners
103. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Supp. V 1999) (stating that a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255 is the proper means for a prisoner in federal custody to challenge the validity
or constitutionality of a conviction). See Capaldi v. Pontesso, 135 F.3d 1122, 1123 (6th
Cir. 1998).
104. See, e.g., In re Tatum, 233 F.3d 857 (5th Cir. 2000).
105. 489 U.S. 288 (1989). There is not an issue as to Apprendi's applicability to
cases on direct review of drug convictions that have not become final. "[N]ew rules
should always be applied retroactively to cases on direct review." Id. at 303 (plurality
opinion). "'[F]ailure to apply a newly declared constitutional rule to criminal cases
pending on direct review violates basic norms of constitutional adjudication.'" Id. at
304 (plurality opinion) (quoting Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 322 (1987) (adopting Justice Harlan's view)).
106. See Singleton v. United States, 26 F.3d 233, 237 (1st Cir. 1994); Dalton v.
United States, 862 F.2d 1307, 1310-11 (8th Cir. 1988).
107. See Singleton, 26 F.3d at 236-37.
108. Title 28, United States Code, § 2255 provides that:
A prisoner in [federal] custody under sentence of a court established by
Act of Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the
sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United
States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or
that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is
otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the court which imposed
the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.
... If the court finds that the judgment was rendered without jurisdiction,
or that the sentence imposed was not authorized by law or otherwise open to
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challenging federal judgments." 9 Like the writ of habeas corpus for a
state prisoner, the § 2255 motion is an obvious vehicle for the retroactive application of new principles of law announced after the judgment under attack became final. 110

Although the wording of the statute allows prisoners to challenge
their convictions and sentences based on a violation of their constitutional rights or of the laws of the United States,"1 the principle in

Apprendi should not apply to collateral attacks at all.' 12 The new
principle adopted by the Supreme Court in Apprendi-requiringany
fact, other than prior convictions, that exposes a defendant to a penalty beyond the maximum authorized by the statutory offense to be
submitted to the jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt" 3 -is a

"new rule[ ] of constitutional procedure,""' 4 not applicable to cases on

collateral review under Teague v. Lane."5 Although prisoners claiming relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 are correct in that Apprendi sets

forth a new rule of constitutional law,' 1 6 it is not one which entitles
collateral attack, or that there has been such a denial or infringement of the
constitutional rights of the prisoner as to render the judgment vulnerable to
collateral attack, the court shall vacate and set the judgment aside and shall
discharge the prisoner or resentence him or grant a new trial or correct the
sentence as may appear appropriate.
28 U.S.C. § 2255.
109. LARRY W. YACKLE, POSTCONVIcTION REMEDIES 154-55 (1981).
110. See supra note 8.

111. 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
112. The Eleventh Circuit has left open the question whether Apprendi is a "new
rule of constitutional law" for purposes of collateral attack. In re Joshua, 224 F.3d
1281, 1283 n.3 (11th Cir. 2000).
113. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 2362-63 (2000).
114. Bilzerian v. United States, 127 F.3d 237, 241 (2d Cir. 1997). With respect to
the multi-part federal drug statutes, Apprendi does not alter what the government
must prove in a criminal matter but only changes to whom the government must
prove drug quantity and type. Therefore, it is not a new rule of substantive law but a
new rule of criminal procedure. Cf. United States v. Shunk, 113 F.3d 31, 35 (5th Cir.
1997) (holding that the new rule established in United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506
(1995), requiring a materiality element for 18 U.S.C. § 1001 to be decided by the jury,
not by a judge, beyond a reasonable doubt is a new rule of criminal procedure not
retroactively applicable under the Teague rule).

115. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
116. Apprendi, 120 S.Ct. at 2362-63; Teague, 489 U.S. at 301 (plurality opinion)
("[A] case announces a new rule if the result was not dictated by precedent existing at
the time the defendant's conviction became final."). The Apprendi rule was based on
dictum set out in Jones v. United States, Apprendi, 120 S.Ct. at 2362, that "any fact

(other than prior conviction)" that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must
be charged in an "indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable

doubt." Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 243 n.6 (1999). Therefore, Apprendi is a
new rule because Jones did not "dictate" this rule but merely suggested it. Id. Apprendi adopted it as a constitutional right under the due process clauses of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments. Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2362-63. Furthermore, the
Court in Jones made clear that its decision "does not announce any new principle of
constitutional law." Jones, 526 U.S. at 251 n.11.
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them to freedom from a conviction that became final before the Supreme Court's decision in Apprendi.
The Constitution neither prohibits nor requires retrospective application of new rules to cases litigated before the new rules were established." 7 Rather, the Supreme Court has recognized that the
requirement of retroactive application does not automatically turn on
the particular provision of the Constitution on which the new rule is
based but is a matter of degree.' 18 The test consistently employed by
the courts to decide whether a new constitutional rule of criminal procedure should be applied retroactively is given in Teague v. Lane." 9
In Teague, the Supreme Court held that, "[u]nless they fall within
an exception to the general rule, new constitutional rules of criminal
procedure will not be applicable to those cases which have become
final before the new rules are announced."' 12 0 The Court then defined
the exceptions, stating that a "new constitutional rule" may be applied
retroactively on federal collateral review only if the rule (1) puts
"'certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the
power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe"" 2 or (2) is
a rule of procedure that is "'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."' 1 22 Therefore, most new procedural rules are inapplicable on
collateral attack.
The Supreme Court set out in O'Dell v. Netherland three steps in
determining whether, under the Teague doctrine, a "court-made" rule
is retroactively applicable on collateral review. 2 3 First, the court must
determine the date upon which the conviction became final.'2 4 If the
conviction became final after the "court-made" rule, then any application of the rule would be retroactive. 125 Second, the court must consider whether the rule is "new., 126 It must be determined in hindsight
whether the district court that convicted and sentenced the defendant
would have "'felt compelled by existing precedent to conclude that
117. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 629 (1965).
118. Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 728-29 (1966).
119. Teague, 489 U.S. at 288.
120. Id. at 310 (plurality opinion).
121. Id. at 311 (plurality opinion) (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667,
692 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
122. Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 693 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)),
quoted in Teague, 489 U.S. at 311 (plurality opinion). The two exceptions to nonretroactivity adopted in Teague were originally introduced in Mackey, id. at 692-93
(Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), by Justice Harlan, who believed
that new rules generally should not be applied to cases on collateral review. See id.
(Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
123. O'Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151, 156-57 (1997).
124. Id. at 156.
125. See Teague, 489 U.S. at 310 (plurality opinion).
126. O'Dell, 521 U.S. at 156.
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the [Apprendi] rule ...was required by the Constitution."' 127 If the
district court reasonably12 8 would not have felt compelled to rule in
the defendant's favor by precedent existing at the time the conviction
became final, then the rule is "new. ' 12 9 A case announces a new rule
when it "breaks new ground," "imposes a new obligation on the States
or the Federal Government" or was not "dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction became final.' 13 Third,
if the rule that the defendant seeks to invoke pursuant to a § 2255
motion is "new," the court must determine whether the rule falls
within one of two narrow
exceptions to the non-retroactivity principle
3
set out in Teague.1 1

Under this standard, Apprendi clearly adopted a "new" rule.' 3 2 No
prior decision had "dictated" that any factor that increases the maximum punishment for an offense must be submitted to the jury on a
reasonable doubt instruction.

33

In fact, as recently as 1998, the Su-

preme Court had upheld sentences that were greater than the otherwise applicable statutory maximums, based on facts that were neither
charged in the indictment nor found by the jury beyond a reasonable
doubt. 134 First, Apprendi contradicts the precedent in Monge v. California135 where the court clearly "rejected an absolute rule that an

enhancement constitutes ...element[s] of the offense any time that it
increases the maximum sentence to which [the] defendant is exposed.

13 6

Second, in Almendarez-Torres,3 7 the Court reasoned that

whether a fact is an element of an offense or a sentencing factor is
generally a matter of legislative intent.

38

In adherence to these deci-

sions, the circuit courts construed the provisions of the multi-part statutes at issue, 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b) and 960(b), as penalty provisions
and not elements of the offense.' 3 9 Apprendi therefore imposes a
127. Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 527 (1997) (quoting Saffle v. Parks, 494
U.S. 484, 488 (1990)), quoted in O'Dell, 521 U.S. at 156.
128. "[T]he Teague doctrine 'validates reasonable, good-faith interpretations of existing precedents made by ...

courts even though they are shown to be contrary to

later decisions."' O'Dell, 521 U.S. at 156 (quoting Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407,
414 (1990)).
129. Id.
130. Teague, 489 U.S. at 301 (plurality opinion).
131. O'Dell, 521 U.S. at 156-57.
132. See supra notes 113-15 and accompanying text.
133. See id.

134. Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721 (1998); Almendarez-Torres v. United States,
523 U.S. 224 (1998).
135. Monge, 524 U.S. at 721.
136. Id. at 729.
137. Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 224.

138. Id. at 228.
139. United States v. Angle, 230 F.3d 113, 122 (4th Cir. 2000). Courts look to
whether other "courts have justifiably relied on a prior rule of law said to be different
from that announced by the decision whose retroactivity is at issue." Solem v.
Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 646 (1984). "When the Court has explicitly overruled past precedent, disapproved a practice it has sanctioned in prior cases, or overturned a long-
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new, heightened obligation on federal prosecutors, one the Court
would not have felt compelled to impose in light of the precedent existing prior to the Apprendi decision.
Apprendi's new rule cannot be applied retroactively on collateral
review unless it falls within one of the Teague exceptions. 140 The first
exception does not apply to Apprendi because Apprendi does not
"'forbid[ ] criminal punishment of certain primary conduct"' or "'prohibit[ ] a certain category of punishment for a class of defendants because of their status or offense."' 1 4 1 It simply imposes procedural
requirements for the establishment of certain facts.142 The Court did
not hold that a person may not be punished for certain conduct but
143
that he may not be punished in the absence of certain safeguards.
The second Teague exception allows retroactive application of "watershed rules of criminal procedure implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding.

' 144

The scope of the

second exception suggested by Justice Harlan is limited to those "new
procedures without which the likelihood of an accurate conviction
[would be] seriously diminished, 1
1

45

resulting in a "complete miscar-

46

riage of justice'
in the absence of their administration. "[S]uch procedures would be so central to an accurate determination of
innocence or guilt,... it [is] unlikely that many such components of
basic due process have yet to emerge." '47 "Typically,... any conviction free from federal constitutional error at the time it became final,
will be found, upon reflection, to have been fundamentally fair and
conducted under those procedures essential to the substance of a full

hearing.

' 148

Does Apprendi diminish the fundamental fairness and accuracy of
those convictions under the federal drug statutes that have become
final before June 26, 2000? Requiring the jury to make a factual finding of drug quantity beyond a reasonable doubt when the prosecution
alleges a quantity that would subject the defendant to a penalty above
the maximum for the specified drug type is not central to the accurate
standing practice approved by near-unanimous lower-court authority, the reliance
and effect factors in themselves 'have virtually compelled a finding of nonretroactivity."' Id. (quoting United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 549-50 (1982)).
140. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311 (1989) (plurality opinion).
141. O'Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151, 157 (1997) (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492
U.S. 302, 330 (1989)).
142. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 2354 (2000) ("The substantive basis
for New Jersey's enhancement is thus not at issue; the adequacy of New Jersey's procedure is.").
143. Id.
144. O'Dell, 521 U.S. at 157.
145. Teague, 489 U.S. at 313 (plurality opinion).
146. Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962).
147. Teague, 489 U.S. at 313 (plurality opinion).
148. Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 693 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
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determination of a defendant's guilt or innocence under §§ 841 or
960. 49 Rather, Apprendi applies to the procedure in assessing a defendant's sentence.
Of course, the right to a jury determination of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is an important constitutional protection that helps to
ensure that criminal convictions are accurate and reliable. However,
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has held in United States v.
Shunk 5 ° that failure to give a reasonable doubt instruction to the jury
is not a cognizable issue on collateral review because it does not meet
the watershed exception under Teague. 5 1 In Shunk, two prisoners
convicted of conspiracy to misapply bank funds, defraud a bank, and
deceive the Federal Home Loan Bank Board by making false statements in reports of and statements for the bank, filed motions pursuant to § 2255 more than one year after their convictions became
final) 5 2 Specifically, the petitioners sought relief under the new rule
established in United States v. Gaudin,53 requiring the Government,
in a false statement prosecution, to prove "materiality" to the jury
rather than the judge.1 54 Even though the rule was a clear break from
prior decisions, the Court held that the Gaudin rule did not "'alter[ ]
our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements essential to the
fairness of a proceeding.' '' 155 "[O]ne can easily envision a system of
'ordered liberty' in which certain elements of a crime can or must be
156
proved to a judge, not to the jury."'
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has held that the rule under Caldwell v. Mississippi,157 prohibiting imposition of a death sentence by a
sentencer who has been led to falsely believe that the responsibility
for determining the appropriateness of a capital sentence lies elsewhere,1 58 does not constitute a watershed rule of criminal proce149. See Singleton v. United States, 26 F.3d 233, 236-37 (1st Cir. 1994). The court

determined that an erroneous jury instruction was cognizable under § 2255 unless the
court found it "'highly probable' that the challenged action did not affect the [jurors']
judgment." Id. (quoting United States v. Hernandez-Bermudez, 857 F.2d 50, 53 (1st
Cir. 1988)).
150. 113 F.3d 31 (5th Cir. 1997).
151. Id. at 36 (citing Teague, 489 U.S. at 311-13 (plurality opinion)).
152. Id. at 32-34.
153. 515 U.S. 506 (1995).
154. The Gaudin Court held that materiality was an element of the crime of making
false statements in a matter within the jurisdiction of a federal agency, and a defendant was entitled to have the jury decide whether the government had proven that
element beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 509-11. Shunk involved convictions under
18 U.S.C. § 1006, "making false entries in the records of certain federal banking institutions," of which "materiality" is an element. Shunk, 113 F.3d at 34.
155. Shunk, 113 F.3d at 37 (quoting United States v. Swindall, 107 F.3d 831, 836
(11th Cir. 1997)).
156. Id.
157. 472 U.S. 320 (1985).
158. Id. at 328-29.
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dure. 5 9 Failure to consider a Caldwell claim, one that attacks the
accuracy of the sentencing determination,
does not constitute a funda160
mental miscarriage of justice.
For retroactivity purposes, the relevant inquiry is the relative importance of a procedural safeguard to the protection the defendant
did in fact receive. 161 However, the Supreme Court has continually
denied retroactive application of new constitutional standards when
the defendant had the benefit of less stringent standards protecting
the same interests. 62 Thus, "[i]t is ...not enough ...

to say that a

new rule [of constitutional procedure] is aimed at improving the accuracy of trial. More is required. 1 163 New rules that only provide an
additional measure of protection to an existing guarantee of due process protection against fundamental fairness are not absolute prerequisites that fall within Teague's second exception.1 64 These new rules
must improve accuracy and "alter our understanding of the
bedrock
1 65
procedural elements" that are essential to fairness of trial.
Under Shunk, a reasonable doubt instruction as to drug quantity
does not meet this test. In addition, Apprendi, like Caldwell, merely
provides an additional measure of due process protection against error in sentencing federal drug offenders because defendants have always been able to file objections to factual findings of drug quantity in
the PSR. Apprendi "did not confer a substantive constitutional right
[with respect to the federal drug statutes] that had not existed before;
it 'created a protective umbrella serving to enhance a constitutional
guarantee.' "166 Therefore, neither of the Teague exceptions applies to
exclude Apprendi from the non-retroactivity rule with respect to drug
cases.
2.

The Principle of Finality

In addition to the foregoing argument, one must consider the application of Apprendi on collateral review with regard to the nature and
purpose of habeas corpus. Although habeas corpus has always been
used to challenge judgments that have otherwise become final, it is
159. Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 245 (1990).
160. Id. at 244.

161. See Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 644 (1984). "'[W]hether a constitutional
rule of criminal procedure does or does not enhance the reliability of the fact-finding
process at trial is necessarily a matter of degree."' Id. (quoting Johnson v. New
Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 728-29 (1966)).
162. Sawyer, 497 U.S. at 242-43 (citing Solem, 465 U.S. at 654 (Powell, J., concurring)). Findings of drug quantity under pre-Apprendi law, although less specific, provided considerable safeguards.
163. Id. at 242.
164. Id. at 244.
165. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311 (1989) (plurality opinion) (alteration in original) (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 693-94 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
166. Solem, 465 U.S. at 644 n.4 (quoting Michigan v. Payne, 412 U.S. 47, 54 (1973)).
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not a substitute for direct review.' 67 There is much interest in limiting
the scope of habeas relief through § 2255 motions because the motion
undermines the finality of criminal judgments and the courts' traditional avoidance of constitutional issues. 68 "[T]he purpose of federal
habeas corpus is to ensure that... convictions comply with the federal
law in existence at the time the conviction became final, and not to
provide a mechanism for the continuing reexamination of final judgments based upon later emerging legal doctrine."' 69 This concern for
finality calls for the "sounder" approach of applying the law prevailing
at the time the conviction became final rather than disposing of cases
on the basis of intervening changes in constitutional interpretation.'70
The past cannot always be erased with a new judicial declaration.
The fact that life and liberty are at stake in criminal prosecutions does
not mean that the "'conventional notions of finality"' have no place in
criminal litigation.171 "Application of constitutional rules not in existence at the time a conviction became final seriously undermines the
principle of finality which is essential to the operation of our criminal
justice system. Without172finality, the criminal law is deprived of much
of its deterrent effect.

If Apprendi is applied retroactively on collateral review to the tens
of thousands of federal drug convictions, it may lead society to believe
that convicted criminals are only tentatively confined to prison with
the opportunity every day afterward to re-litigate the imposition of
their sentences. 173 Allowing thousands of prisoners to collaterally attack their sentences based on Apprendi would cause a flood of costly
re-litigation where the defendants' trials and appeals conformed to the
then-existing constitutional standards.
One incentive behind the threat of §§ 2255 and 2241174 motions is to
encourage "'trial and appellate courts ...

to conduct their proceed-

ings in a manner consistent with established constitutional standards." ' 1 75 To do this, the district court "'need only apply the
constitutional standards that prevailed at the time the original pro167. Teague, 489 U.S. at 306 (plurality opinion) (quoting Mackey v. United States,
401 U.S. 667, 682-83 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
168. See YACKLE supra note 109, at 155.
169. Sawyer, 497 U.S. at 234 (discussing Teague).
170. Teague, 489 U.S. at 306 (plurality opinion) (quoting Mackey v. United States,
401 U.S. 667, 689 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
171. Id. at 309 (plurality opinion) (quoting Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? CollateralAttacks on CriminalJudgments, 38 U. CM. L. REV. 142, 150 (1970)).
172. Id. at 309 (plurality opinion).
173. See Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 691 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
174. See supra note 7.
175. Teague, 489 U.S. at 306 (plurality opinion) (quoting Desist v. United States,
394 U.S. 244, 262-63 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
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ceedings took place." 176 Therefore, if the court met the existing constitutional standards regarding drug quantity that were prevalent at
the time of conviction, and sentenced the defendant according to the
federal statutes and the Sentencing Guidelines, failure to specifically
allege and prove drug quantity beyond a reasonable doubt is not
grounds for collateral attack.
The burdens and "'costs imposed upon the [government] by retroactive application of new rules of constitutional law on habeas corpus
...far

outweigh the benefits of this application." 177 Narcotics prose-

cutions under 21 U.S.C. § 841 represent a significant percentage of
total federal criminal prosecutions. In 1999, United States Attorneys
178
nationwide filed 50,779 criminal cases against 71,673 defendants.
Of these totals, 16,617 cases against 29,846 defendants were narcotics
cases. 179 Of 57,879 defendants actually convicted of crimes in 1999,
23,133 were defendants in narcotics cases. 8° Narcotics cases, therefore, constitute more than one-third of all criminal cases and include
about forty percent of all defendants prosecuted and convicted. Full
retroactive application of Apprendi would call into question tens of
thousands of sentences under the federal drug statutes alone. The fact
that a new procedural decision potentially affects a large percentage
of all federal convictions is a compelling reason against its retroactive
application. 181
3. No Substantial Harm or Prejudice
If the Supreme Court holds that Apprendi is retroactively applicable on collateral review, the grounds for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255
will be narrower than those on direct appeal. On direct appeal, any
alleged constitutional error requires reversal unless the government
1 82
can show that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
However, when a defendant fails to raise an issue at trial or on direct
176. Id. (plurality opinion) (quoting Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 263
(1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
177. Id. at 310 (plurality opinion) (quoting Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 654
(1984) (Powell, J., concurring)). The Teague Court found this statement and other
criticisms against retroactive application persuasive, including "'courts are understandably frustrated when they faithfully apply existing constitutional law only to
have a federal court discover, during a [habeas] proceeding, new constitutional commands."' Id. (plurality opinion) (quoting Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 128 (1982)).
"[A]pplication of new rules to cases on collateral review ... continually forces the
[government] to marshal resources in order to keep in prison defendants whose trials
and appeals conformed to then-existing constitutional standards." Id. (plurality
opinion).
178. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS - 1999 at 399 tbl.5.6 (2000), available at http://
www.albany.edu/sourcebook/1995/pdf/t56.pdf.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. See Halliday v. United States, 394 U.S. 831, 833 (1969).
182. Dalton v. United States, 862 F.2d 1307, 1309 (8th Cir. 1988).
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appeal, it is reviewed only under the "'cause' and actual 'prejudice"'

standard (the Frady standard).1 83 A prisoner raising the Apprendi is-

sue for the first time on collateral attack, on the basis that drug quantity or type was not submitted to the jury, must show "'cause' for his
procedural default and actual 'prejudice"' resulting from the error.' 84
The cause and actual prejudice standard is a significantly higher standard than the "plain error" standard applied on direct appeal.185
The cause standard requires the petitioner-defendant to show
"'some objective factor external to the defense"' that prevented him
from raising the issue of drug quantity before the district court and on
direct appeal.186 These factors include a showing of "interference by
officials that makes compliance with the procedural rule impracticable, a showing that the factual or legal basis for the claim was not
reasonably available to counsel at the prior occasion,
and ineffective
'1 87
assistance of counsel in the constitutional sense.
Decisions that overturn a "'longstanding and widespread practice'
...

will excuse a prior failure to raise a claim."' 88 If a defendant was

sentenced within the least severe penalty range under 21 U.S.C.
§§ 841(b) or 960(b) for a specific drug type, then he would not have
had any factual or legal basis to invoke the Apprendi rule at the prior

proceeding. For example, if a defendant was convicted of manufacturing, possessing, and distributing of narcotics under § 841, and sentenced to the lowest maximum penalty of ten years imprisonment
under § 841(b)(1)(C), Apprendi would not apply because drug quan-

tity was not used to increase his sentence beyond the statutory maximum.' 89 On the other hand, prisoners who were subjected to an
183. Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 622 (1998); United States v. Frady, 456
U.S. 152, 170 (1982).
184. Frady, 456 U.S. at 168; United States v. Shaid, 937 F.2d 228, 232, 234-35 (5th
Cir. 1992) (en banc); Dalton, 862 F.2d at 1309 (stating that the cause and prejudice
standard applies when a petitioner attempts to show, in light of a subsequent decision,
that the jury instruction misstated the law).
185. Shaid, 937 F.2d at 232 (citing Frady, 456 U.S. at 166).
186. Romero v. Collins, 961 F.2d 1181, 1183 (5th Cir. 1992) (quoting Murray v.
Carrier, 447 U.S. 478, 488 (1986)), quoted in United States v. Guerra, 94 F.3d 989, 993
(5th Cir. 1996).
187. United States v. Guerra, 94 F.3d 989, 993 (5th Cir. 1996).
188. Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 17 (1984) (quoting United States v. Johnson, 457
U.S. 537, 551 (1982)), quoted in Dalton, 862 F.2d at 1310. See United States v. Logan,
135 F.3d 353, 355 (5th Cir. 1998) (stating that although the cause requirement was
satisfied because a procedurally defaulted objection was predicated on grounds that
had yet to be established at the time of earlier appeals, the prejudice requirement was
not met because the new definition of the crime would not invalidate the defendant's
conviction). But see Bousley, 523 U.S. at 622-23 (stating that the petitioner had procedurally defaulted by failing to raise a claim that his guilty plea had no factual basis
because the Supreme Court subsequently changed the definition of the crime charged
on direct appeal). Therefore, the petitioner's prior ignorance of the new law did not
meet the cause prong of the cause and prejudice test. See id.
189. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (1994).
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enhanced maximum sentence based on a drug amount decided by the
judge may be able to establish the cause prong on collateral review.
The prejudice requirement of Frady is equally difficult to meet. It
demands a showing of actual prejudice, not merely that the errors at
trial created a possibility of prejudice.1 9 ° A showing of actual
prejudice requires the petitioner to establish that, but for the error, he
might not have been convicted.' 9 ' The defendant must prove that the
erroneous jury instruction, omitting an element from the jury,
"worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire
192
trial with error.
Considering the information that the district court has traditionally
used (prior to Apprendi) to determine drug quantity, the prejudice
prong is a tough hurdle to clear. Based on information provided in
PSRs, evidence presented at trial, and witness testimony, if any, it will
be difficult for a drug offender to argue that the district court did not
properly determine the type and quantity for which he was held accountable.' 93 If the government had been held to the Apprendi standard at the time of the defendant's indictment and trial, it is unlikely
that the outcome regarding drug quantity would have been different.
Only after a petitioner has met both requirements (cause and
prejudice) should a reviewing court determine the merits of his
claim. 194 Additionally, any error in failing to instruct the jury on an
essential element of the offense is reviewed under the harmless error
standard. 195 First, it must appear beyond a reasonable doubt, on the
whole record, that the error contributed to the verdict and sentence.
Otherwise, any failure to instruct the jury on drug quantity is harmless.1 96 Second, if evidence at trial on drug quantity was "uncontroverted," then the error is harmless. 197 Therefore, if the prosecution's
190. Dalton, 862 F.2d at 1310.
191. Guerra, 94 F.3d at 994.
192. United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982).
193. See Sustache-Rivera v. United States, 221 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2000), cert. denied,
121 S.Ct. 1364 (2001).
194. Frady, 456 U.S. at 168. Some circuits have held that, in certain circumstances,
a showing of cause and prejudice is not required where a defendant raises a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel for the first time in a § 2255 motion. E.g., Smullen v.
United States, 94 F.3d 20, 23 (1st Cir. 1996); Ciak v. United States, 59 F.3d 296, 303
(2d Cir. 1995).
195. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1999) (quoting Johnson v. United
States, 520 U.S. 461, 469 (1997)) ("recogniz[ing] that improperly omitting an element
from the jury can 'easily be analogized to improperly instructing the jury on ... an

error which is subject to harmless-error analysis'" even though the verdict may not be
seen as a "complete verdict" on every element of the offense); United States v. PerezMontanez, 202 F.3d 434 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 886 (2000); Peck v. United
States, 106 F.3d 450, 457 (2d Cir. 1997) (stating that no prejudice was shown when the
jury was given incomplete instruction regarding an essential element of the offense
charged because, subject to harmless error standard, a rational juror would have
found the element beyond a reasonable doubt despite the omission).
196. See United States v. Rogers, 94 F.3d 1519, 1526 (11th Cir. 1996).
197. Neder, 527 U.S. at 18.
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evidence sufficiently established, without dispute, the drug quantity
attributable to the defendant, any error in failing to give the jury a
reasonable doubt instruction as to drug quantity was harmless and
without prejudice to the defendant.' 98
In Bousley v. United States,'99 the Court held that a petitioner who

had procedurally defaulted by failing to raise a claim on direct appeal
and had failed to meet the cause prong of the cause and prejudice test,

may still overcome the default if he can show that he was actually
innocent of the crime. 2°° The petitioner's innocence must be proven
to an extent that no reasonable juror would convict him. 20 1 However,
this standard is a higher threshold than the cause and prejudice stan-

dard. The defendant's burden of proof is subject to any government
evidence of the petitioner's guilt, even beyond that presented at
trial.2 °2
IV.

A.

STATUTORY RESTRICTIONS

The Statute of Limitations and Second or Successive Motions

Once a defendant's chance to file a direct appeal has been waived
or expired, the courts are entitled to presume that he stands fairly and
finally convicted. To ensure finality in criminal proceedings, the legislature, through the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
(AEDPA) of 1996, imposed several bars to federal prisoners' efforts
to obtain post-conviction relief.20 3 The AEDPA provides that "[a] 1year period of limitation shall apply to a motion" under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255.204 Additionally, the statute includes provisions limiting application of second or successive motions. Under § 2255, the one-year
limitation period
shall run from the latest of(1) the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final;
198. Id. at 17-19. "[W]here a defendant did not, and apparently could not, bring
forth facts contesting the omitted element, answering the question whether the jury
verdict would have been the same absent the error does not fundamentally undermine the purposes of the jury trial guarantee." Id. at 19. If a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion
plainly shows on its face that the movant is not entitled to relief, the judge who presided over the movant's trial and imposed sentence must dismiss the motion. 28
U.S.C. § 2255 (Supp. V 1999). Where the court does not dismiss such a motion, it
may review the record and examine any additionally ordered materials to determine
whether an evidentiary hearing is required. Id. See also Biami v. United States, 144
F.3d 1096, 1096-97 (7th Cir. 1998) (stating that the petitioner was entitled to an evidentiary hearing to determine the type of cocaine he possessed when the drug's form
affected the sentence and the record was inconclusive).
199. 523 U.S. 614 (1998).
200. Id. at 622.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 623-24.
203. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-132, § 105, 110 Stat. 1214.
204. Id.; 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Supp. V 1999).
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(2) the date on which the impediment to making a motion created by governmental action in violation of the Constitution or laws
of the United States is removed, if the movant was prevented from
making a motion by such governmental action;
(3) the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized
by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by
the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on
collateral review; or
(4) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or claims
presented 20could
have been discovered through the exercise of due
5
diligence.
Those defendants whose drug convictions have been final for more
than one year under subsection (1) above are attempting to invoke
provision (3) of § 2255 to circumvent the one-year limitation period,
based on the new Apprendi decision. However, the Supreme Court
has not "made [Apprendi] retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review. '' 21 The courts of appeals have held that the Supreme
Court must have actually issued a decision making a new rule retroactive to cases on collateral review. 20 7 The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals recognized that "Apprendi does not state that it applies
retroactively to other cases on collateral review. ' 20 ' Furthermore, no
other Supreme Court decision retroactively applies Apprendi to cases
on collateral review. 2 9 The Seventh Circuit has even warned prisoners against "wasting everyone's time with futile applications" for filing
§ 2255 motions pursuant to the Apprendi rule. 2a° Therefore, the temporal limitation for the purpose of § 2255 should not be extended
merely because the defendant previously lacked the ability to assert
an Apprendi claim.
Defendants filing second or successive motions pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2255, even within the one-year period following the finality
of their convictions, must meet the requirements and obtain permission as provided by the statute. Under § 2255:
A second or successive motion must be certified as provided in
section 2244 by a panel of the appropriate court of appeals to contain205. 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The limitations imposed by the AEDPA apply only to cases
filed after the Act's effective date of April 24, 1996. David v. United States, 134 F.3d
470, 473 n.1 (1st Cir. 1998).
206. 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
207. See Bennett v. United States, 119 F.3d 470, 471 (7th Cir. 1997); In re Vial, 115
F.3d 1192, 1197 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc). See also In re Joshua, 224 F.3d 1281, 1283
(11th Cir. 2000) (stating that Apprendi has not been made retroactive, even if it does
satisfy the criteria for retroactive application in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989)).
208. Talbott v. Indiana, 226 F.3d 866, 869 (7th Cir. 2000). Accord Sustache-Rivera
v. United States, 221 F.3d 8, 15 (1st Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121' S. Ct. 1364 (2001).
209. Talbott, 226 F.3d at 869.
210. Id.
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(1) newly discovered evidence that, if proven and viewed in light
of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear
and convincing evidence that no reasonable fact-finder would have
found the movant guilty of the offense; or
(2) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on
collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously
unavailable. 21 '
On a second or successive motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, a federal prisoner may no longer contend that his sentence was imposed in
violation of the laws of the United States. He is restricted to constitutional claims by permission of the court.21 2 Even if the defendant
could not have reasonably presented this constitutional claim in his
earlier petition, that fact does not exclude the motion from being second or successive.2 13
Under the first provision regarding subsequent § 2255 motions, a
"factually unavailable" Apprendi claim must be based on newly discovered evidence that would demonstrate the applicant's actual innocence. 2 14 It is arguable that the "actual innocence" exception does not
even apply to an Apprendi claim. First, it is doubtful that the actual
innocence exception applies to non-capital cases.2 15 Second, it is unlikely that a prisoner convicted for a felony drug offense will put forth
new evidence that demonstrates his innocence of the underlying
crime.21 6 This actual innocence standard is highly stringent and extremely difficult to pass. 17 As stated above, the defendant's burden
of proof is subject to any evidence the government may present, even
beyond that presented at trial. 2 18 At the same time, the investigation
and possible retrial to assess the substantiality of the petitioner's claim
could be hindered "by
problems of lost evidence, faulty memory, and
2 19
missing witnesses."
A petitioner relying on the new rule in Apprendi for relief on a
second § 2255 motion under subsection (2) above must establish that
Apprendi (1) constitutes a "new rule of constitutional law," (2) was
"made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme
Court," and (3) "was previously unavailable" in order for the court to
211. 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
212. Sustache-Rivera, 221 F.3d at 12.
213. Id. at 13.
214. Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 622 (1998).
215. See, e.g., United States v. Wiley, 245 F.3d 750, 752 (8th Cir. 2001) (citing Embrey v. Hershberger, 131 F.3d 739, 740-41 (8th Cir. 1997) (en banc)).
216. See, e.g., United States v. Bailey, 235 F.3d 1069, 1075 (8th Cir. 2000), cert.
denied, 70 U.S.L.W. 3239 (U.S. Oct. 1, 2001) (No. 00-10797); United States v. Roberson, 194 F.3d 408, 413 n.3 (3d Cir. 1999); Dyer v. United States, 23 F.3d 1421, 1423
(8th Cir. 1994).
217. See Bousley, 523 U.S. at 623-24.
218. Id. at 624.
219. Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 650 (1994).
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grant leave to file the petition.2 2 ° When considering whether the court
will grant permission to file, the proper inquiry is whether reasonable
jurors could differ on these three points. 22 1 Although Apprendi is a
"new rule of constitutional law, ' 222 it has not been "made retroactive
to cases on collateral review. ' 223 Thus, collateral attack of an enhanced sentence based on an Apprendi claim does not meet the requirements for a second or successive petition.2 24
B.

The "Savings Clause" Provision of 28 U.S.C. § 2255

The final question regarding the retroactive application of Apprendi
becomes whether a prisoner serving an enhanced sentence under the
federal drug statutes, who has been denied relief from his conviction
or denied permission to petition for relief under § 2255 pursuant to
Apprendi, may rely on § 2255's "savings clause" to subsequently seek
a remedy under traditional habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241.225 Invoking the "savings clause" allows a federal prisoner to
file a successive habeas corpus petition pursuant to § 2241 if the court
has denied him relief by a § 2255 motion, and it "appears that the
remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of
his detention. '2 26 In other words, if Apprendi is a "constitutional rule
of criminal procedure," and thus not applicable on collateral attack
under Teague v. Lane,2 27 may the petitioner re-file a § 2241 habeas
corpus motion as an alternative? Further, may a petitioner avoid the
"gatekeeping function" of the court of appeals by filing an application
for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241?
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals recognized a third narrow exunder Teague regarding this
ception to the non-retroactivity doctrine
22J9k
228
In Jackson v. Johnson,2 29 the court stated that "[w]hen an
issue.
alleged constitutional right is susceptible of vindication only on habeas
review, application of Teague to bar full consideration of the claim
would effectively foreclose any opportunity for the right ever to be
recognized, 2 30 indicating that absolute preclusion under Teague may
220. Sustache-Rivera v. United States, 221 F.3d 8, 15 (1st Cir. 2000) (citing 28
U.S.C. § 2255 (Supp. V 1999)), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 1364 (2001).
221. Id. (citing Slack v. McDaniel, 120 S. Ct. 1595, 1604 (2000)).
222. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Supp. V 1999)).
223. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Supp. V 1999)).
224. Id. at 15 n.12. "The Supreme Court may ... hold that the... Apprendi rule is
to be retroactively applied to cases on collateral review. (This likely depends upon
whether the Court considers the . . . Apprendi rule procedural or substantive.) Until
that time, any second or successive petition seeking retroactive application ... must
be considered premature." Id.
225. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Supp. V 1999).
226. Id.; Sustache-Rivera, 221 F.3d at 15.
227. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
228. Jackson v. Johnson, 217 F.3d 360, 364 (5th Cir. 2000).
229. Id. at 360.
230. Id. at 364.
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be inappropriate. However, this "exception" is unrecognized by other
courts.23 1

Additionally, Apprendi does not fall within the "savings clause" exception, rendering 28 U.S.C. § 2255 "inadequate or ineffective." The
fact that (1) Apprendi was not an available claim at trial or on appeal,
(2) the AEDPA's one-year statute of limitations has expired for purposes of § 2255, or (3) the defendant does not meet the requirements
for second or successive motions, does not render the remedy under
28 U.S.C. § 2255 inadequate or ineffective, entitling a defendant to refile under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.232 That would contradict interests in finality and render meaningless the AEDPA's 1996 limitations period
and amended requirements. Therefore, the "savings clause" is used
only in limited circumstances and would not apply to a prisoner's
claim that the trial court failed to submit drug quantity (used to enhance the defendant's maximum sentence) to the jury to be determined beyond a reasonable doubt.
The "savings clause" under § 2255 applies when a new statute is
enacted or new meaning is attributed to an existing statute to establish
the prisoner's innocence.2 33 Therefore, Apprendi, a new constitutional
rule of law, does not fit under this exception. Additionally, Apprendi
does not establish innocence merely because a sentence was enhanced
based on drug amount found by the district judge on a preponderance
of the evidence.
If the Supreme Court makes the rule in Apprendi retroactively applicable, then a prisoner may, at that time, extend the statute of limitations to file a § 2255 motion or attempt to obtain permission to file a
second or successive motion. The First Circuit in Sustache-Rivera v.
United States234 stated that there may be an argument in that, until the
Supreme Court issues such a decision, it would be unfair to preclude a
prisoner from invoking the "savings clause. '235 On the other hand, if
the Supreme Court never makes Apprendi retroactively applicable,
the prisoner would be "no worse off than before. ' 236 Finally, most
courts have construed the motion remedy under § 2255 to be the
"functional equivalent of habeas corpus. "237 It should, therefore, replace habeas corpus as a collateral remedy for constitutional error in
federal criminal prosecutions.
231. E.g., United States v. Guardino, 972 F.2d 682, 687 n.7 (6th Cir. 1992); Cowell
v. Leapley, 458 N.W.2d 514, 517 (S.D. 1990).
232. See Sustache-Rivera v. United States, 221 F.3d 8, 16 n.13 (1st Cir. 2000), cert.
denied, 121 S.Ct. 1364 (2001).
233. Id. at 16. See also, e.g., Wofford v. Scott, 177 F.3d 1236, 1242-45 (11th Cir.
1999); Triestman v. United States, 124 F.3d 361, 373-80 (2d Cir. 1997).
234. Sustache-Rivera, 221 F.3d at 8.
235. Id. at 17 n.15.
236. Id. at 16.
237. YACKLE, supra note 109, at 155.
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CONCLUSION

It seems inevitable in light of the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Apprendi that drug quantity and type will now be considered elements of a felony drug offense. 38 Prisoners serving time for
felony drug convictions that became final prior to the Apprendi decision, however, should dismiss the idea that Apprendi provides them
any relief. The fact that a trial court adhered to precedent existing
before the Apprendi decision to determine a defendant's offense level
and sentence should not be a cognizable issue on collateral review of a
conviction under the federal drug statutes. Prior to Apprendi, the Supreme Court declined to establish a rule that required a sentence enhancement to be considered as "an element of the offense any time
that it increase[d] the maximum sentence to which a defendant [was]
exposed. '239 Furthermore, no case prior to Apprendi has dictated that
facts, other than prior convictions, used to enhance a defendant's sentence beyond the statutory maximum must be submitted to the jury
and proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, Apprendi sets
forth a "new" constitutional rule, but it does not entitle every defendant serving a sentence under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) to collaterally attack
his conviction and sentence because the court enhanced his sentence
based on facts determined by a preponderance of the evidence.
Apprendi requires any fact, other than a prior conviction, which
subjects a defendant to a sentence above the statutory maximum to be
proven as an element of the offense at trial.2z ° Failure to comply with
the new procedural standard in Apprendi is a viable claim on direct
appeal. 241 However, new constitutional rules of criminal procedure
are generally not applicable on collateral review unless they fall within
one of the exceptions set out in Teague v. Lane; Apprendi does not.
Apprendi v. New Jersey does not change the substance of any federal
criminal statutory offense or threaten the reliability of a criminal proceeding that adhered to the constitutional standards in place. Even if
Apprendi is a new rule aimed at improving accuracy, that is not
enough to make it retroactively applicable on collateral review. Finally, retroactive application would thwart the principle of finality,
238. On January 31, 2001, the author observed a jury trial for a drug charge under
21 U.S.C. § 841 in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas
with the Honorable Terry R. Means presiding. During the government's delivery of
its case to the jury, the prosecution presented into evidence two boxes full of a white
powdery substance, alleged to be cocaine. Additionally, before closing arguments,
Judge Means informed the government and defense counsel that he had amended the
pattern jury instruction to include a reasonable doubt instruction regarding drug type
and quantity.
239. Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721, 729 (1998).
240. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 2355 (2000).
241. See, e.g., United States v. Buckland, 259 F.3d 1157, 1169 (9th Cir. 2001) (vacating a petitioner's conviction on direct appeal because he was sentenced beyond the
statutory maximum when drug quantity was not submitted to the jury on a reasonable
doubt instruction).
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forcing the federal government to re-litigate a mountain of cases involving the federal drug statutes.
Even if the Supreme Court issues a decision making the Apprendi
rule retroactively applicable, prisoners will have difficulty establishing
harm or prejudice resulting from the alleged error, requiring them to
present evidence that the trial judge incorrectly determined drug
quantity attributable to the defendant. Alternatively, if the defendant
prevails in his claim that evidence at trial was insufficient to support
the specified drug quantity, the appropriate remedy would be to remand the case for re-sentencing according to the least severe maximum penalty imposed for the lesser-included statutory offense, 4 2 not

to invalidate the conviction.
The incentive and purpose behind both state and federal habeas
corpus is to ensure that courts consistently adhere to the constitutional standards existing at the time the original proceedings take
place. The more logical approach is, therefore, one that is consistent
with this idea and that would avoid potential re-litigation of tens of
thousands of federal narcotics convictions.
Meleah Burch
242. See Rutledge v. United States, 517 U.S. 292, 305 (1996) (quoting Austin v.
United States, 382 F.2d 129, 140 (D.C. Cir. 1967)) (holding that a district court may
modify an erroneous judgment by reducing to a lesser included offense and correcting
the sentence "where the evidence is insufficient to support an element of the [greater]
offense stated in the verdict" without vacating the underlying conviction). Accord
United States v. Hunt, 129 F.3d 739, 744-745 (5th Cir. 1997).
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